1. Acknowledgement
Sincere thanks goes to Napier University for providing good library and computer facilities.
2. Brief
This report is an overview on the recommendations of the Egan Report, particularly on the ‘integrated project process’. With the help of demonstration projects the report also analyse how these recommendations may improve the construction technology and the construction process of similar future projects.
The demonstration projects used in this report are found in Scotland and in England.
1. The Scottish Parliament building
2. University of East London
3. Introduction
The Egan Report was published by Sir John Egan on the 16th of July 1998. The aim of the report is to emphasise the findings made by the construction task force. The construction industry is regarded as one of the major indicators of the state of a country’s economy. Too many building fail to deliver performance expected by the client, performing poorly in terms of flexibility of use, operating and maintenance cost and sustainability. The UK construction industry spends around �1 billion each year in rectifying defects and failures. Some one these cannot be foreseen and are therefore unavoidable, however others may be prevented through consideration of the recommendations of the Egan Report.
4. Background to the subject
The finding made by the construction task force stated that Britain as a whole is a continual underachiever in the construction industry. That statement induced fear and uncertainty among the industry and its clients. Inefficiencies and flaws were brought to light in order to reinforce key feature from a plan of action which has been devised in order to strengthen the construction industry. The old way of doing things was based on the following approach:
* Sequential
* Competitive
* Contractually confrontational
* Conventional
And led to unpredictability of out-turn costs and time, poor quality, waste, disputes, accidents and claims.
5. The current position
Learning from past experience is an essential part of continuous improvement in the construction. Company culture must support the leaning process and avoid the spirit of blame and defensiveness. The new ways of doing things are based on Rethinking Construction principles:
* Integration – no separation
* Quality – no cost alone
* Partnering – no confrontation
* Innovation – no conventional
* Performance management � Customer Focus
* Commitment to people
* All backed up by targets for improvement
Instead of dealing with parties sequentially, one should integrate the processes and the team around the service. From the start of the project, get them to work together, pull them together with a common vision and goal. And once together, encourage them to try and stay together in order to learn and develop so that they become a team and use each other’s strengths. Below are some examples:
* The insights of the client
* The needs and experiences of the end-user or operator
* The skills and imagination of the designer
* The know-how, buildability and project management expertise of the contractor
* The knowledge and foresight of suppliers and specialist sub-contractors
* Working towards common objectives, utilizing each other’s skills and supporting their needs around the project and focusing on the client and the end user.
6. Case study 1
The Scottish parliament
With its swirling subtext of politics, death, love, rivalry, money and nationhood, the saga of the Scottish parliament would make a wonderful opera. The vision of the architect and the design team bears no relation to a standard office block. The realisation of this vision has involved complex and challenging decisions for everyone connected to the project. If the new building could have been completed with in the approved project budget, the Scottish parliament would have a distinctive high-quality building of historic significance at a cost which seem to beer comparison with other major public building. Finally, the building was completed but ten times above its original budget and did not meet the dead line.
6.1- Project overview
1. Until 1st June 1999 responsibilities for the project rested with the Secretary of State for Scotland as client. On 1st June 1999 this responsibility transferred to the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body. Project managers are the officials responsible for managing and delivering the project on the client’s behalf, advised and assisted by their appointed cost consultant. Developing the project is the design team headed by the architect Enric Miralles until his death in July 2000. The construction managers coordinate the design and construction process and the work contractors.
2. Since the project was initiated in 1997 the parties have cooperated a great deal of good work.
3. Despite these achievements, there have been challenges throughout the project. In October and November 1998, shortly after commencing the assignment, the architect had difficulty in complying with a demanding project brief which was proved to be unrealistic. In June 1999 the Corporate Body saw the need for other changes. There were serious difficulties with progressing with the project in autumn 1999 which were not fully resolve until the following spring.
4. There was uncertainty about the cost estimates. Project managers were reluctant to concede increase in the project budget until satisfied that these were necessary to deliver a building of the size and quality required. But there were different views on what the most likely costs would be and project managers did not fully inform the client about their cost consultant’s prediction on the cost.
5. Finally, the budget slipped from �40 millions to �431 millions and the dead line was not meet.
6.2- Reasons for the increased costs and late delivery
1. The main reason for the increase on construction cost is that the approved design is more complex that the original ideas for the building at the feasibility stage in 1997, when the initial cost estimates were prepared. The approved design is of a much bigger size and higher quality and is more costly.
2. Concerning the completion date for the project, much of the extended time scale can be attributed to the difficulties in achieving an approved design. Some of the delay arose from difficulties encounter by the architects in complying with the original demanding brief to a tight timetable and unforeseen the changes requested by the client which added to the work load of the design team.
6.3- Recommendations
Below is a number of recommendations based on the Egan Report which, if they are implemented , should help to ensure a better construction technology and construction process of future similar buildings.
1. Project managers should instruct the construction manager and the cost consultant to prepare as soon as practicable a risk analysis, which should identify all the remaining risks to the project and their potential impact in cost and deadlines. It should quantify the most likely outcomes as well as best and worst cases.
2. The project managers should have look at the overall cost provision according the analysis and see that there is separate allowance for risk in the estimate.
3. Project managers, the design team and the construction manager must agree a cost plan taking account of risks and uncertainty in order to meet up with the budget and stay within the deadline.
4. A single authoritative point of contract between the client and the project manager is important and must be confirmed. Similarly, all instructions to the construction manager and the design team on behalf of the client should come only form a single authoritative point within the project managers.
5. Project managers have a key role to oversee and monitor the delivery of the project and represent the client’s requirements and decisions. Project managers should identify and agree major milestones and targets with a project period for the purpose of reporting and monitoring progress, both within the client the design and construction team.
6. In order to obtain more transparency on the project, the project managers should review and report costs regularly (possibly monthly) to the client on a comprehensive and systematic basis. Estimates should include all relevant costs. There should also be comments which draw the client’s attention to possible variances.
7. Case study 2
University of East London
Client – University of East London
Total value – �40.0 Millions
Construction value – �32.0 Millions
Site type – Brownfield
Architect -Edward Cullinan
Project manager -Tuner ; Townsend
Quantity surveyor -Gardiner ; Theobald
Engineers -Waterman’s Livingston Eyre Associates
That particular project consisted of building a new university campus and technology centre, consisting of 3 storey academic buildings, 10 residential accommodation buildings, teaching and learning resource centre, business start up units, research areas, library and lecture theatre, and a hard quality landscape area. The project is located in the London dockland and is opposite London city airport. The university was to provide facilities for 3000 students together with professional development courses.
7.1- Project overview
1. The design team was encouraged to look for environmental friendly solutions. There was a great need to seal out noise and make long term energy saving.
2. The brief contained three basic rules: low energy consumption, resistance to external noise and low maintenance. As heating, cooling and ventilation are big energy users, the design team focused on the various ways of reducing energy.
3. The design team chooses “Termodeck” as it was the only system found to satisfy the three basic rules. It was energy efficient but the building would have to be sealed and insulated hence it would also be out of noise.
4. The site was Brownfield and the existing ground was found to have contamination following soil analysis. The initial plan was to remove the soil and deposit it in licensed tips. But the construction team re-investigated and found that the soil could be treated and reused as ‘fill’ material.
5. Considerable attention was required to achieve an airtight envelope. As few finishes existed to seal joints, careful design of the interfaces between elements was essential.
6. Precast planks installed between June to November 1998, Termodeck carried work from July to December 1998, mechanical connections from September to February 1999.
7.2 Recommendations
Although it was successful construction, during the construction stages, there was some sudden innovation and decisions that have been taken. Below is a recommendation that may improve the construction process of similar project in the future.
1. With no finishes and the need for high insulation and air tightness, the interface details needed close attention not only at the design stages but also during the tendering and construction. As a result of no ceilings, there was a restriction on the routes the services can take and the constructors had to cut numerous holes in the steel beams, which has been both costly and time consuming. The holes through the streelwork became a problem as they needed to be increased. For another client the surface of the precast planks may not be suitable. The design team, the project manager and the architect should have coordinated the services in the building at an early stage along with the Engineers, M&E designers, Precast and Termodeck specialists.
8. Conclusion
Egan suggests the adoption of the recommendations proposed in the report would lead to reduced capital lost, reduced construction time, better predictability, fewer defects combined with increased productivity ,turnover and profit. A successful construction industry is essential for all of us as we all benefit from it and there is no doubt that substantial improvements in quality and efficiency are still possible.
‘We are issuing a challenge to the construction industry to commit itself to change, so that working together, we can create a modern industry, ready to face the new millennium’ #