The democratic system of authorities relies chiefly upon the proper operation and the harmonious relationship between its three chief subdivisions: The Executive Department which has the power to put to death the jurisprudence ; b ) the Legislative Branch which has the power to suggest. enact. amend and revoke the jurisprudence ; c ) the Judiciary which has the power to construe the jurisprudence. Our fundamental law has divided these three most of import maps to these three sections which are considered co-equal and supreme authorization within their ain sphere.
The rule of separation of powers has for its purpose the bar of the complete concentration of authorization in one individual or group of individuals that might take to an mistake or maltreatment to the bias of the whole province. The thought is that the separation of power will bring forth greater action on the portion of these three sections. forestall any of these three sections from over-extending their authorization to the point of infringing into the spheres of the other section. to forestall the possibility of maltreatment by any section in the exercising of its power and to obtain maximal efficiency in the bringing of public service.
Austin Ranney ( 1995 ) one time said that any concentration of powers in a individual subdivision is oppressive and merely true separation of powers will protect the autonomies of the people against the aggressions of authorities. ( Austin Ranney. p. 240 ) Checks and Balances The US Constitution has provided for the rule known as the cheques and balances. Under this rule. the fundamental law has given each section certain powers by which it may keep the other section from improvident action.
This enables the whole province to keep the right balance among them and continue the will of the crowned head as expressed in the fundamental law. Therefore. pursuant to the rule of Checks and Balances. one section is allowed to defy invasions made by one section against another or to rectify errors and mistakes committed by the other section. The rule of separation of powers should non nevertheless be interpreted to intend that there is a sibling competition of some kind in the exercising of the powers of these sections.
The fact remains that even if one section may command. interfere with or infringe upon the Acts of the Apostless done by another section pursuant to the fundamental law. it is still the policy that each section have to interact with one another to accomplish a integrity of intent. There is hence no wall of isolation or animus among the three sections. Blending of Powers Corollary to the rule of separation of powers and the cheques and balances is the rule of blending of powers which is really apparent in the mode every democratic authorities tallies.
In the public presentation of a constitutional undertaking. one section acts in a mode complimentary to or auxiliary to the other. The rules of separation of powers. cheques and balances and blending of powers can be adequately explained in the mode of passage of Torahs and legislative acts. The rule of separation of powers provides that to the legislative belongs the power and authorization to ordain. amend and revoke a jurisprudence. To the executive section belongs the power to implement the jurisprudence. Thus measures are passed by Congress and sent to the President for his blessing.
The rule of cheques and balances is manifested in the manner the president vetoes the measures passed by the Congress. The power to veto measures passed by Congress is stated under Article 1 Section 7 of the United States Constitution. to humor: “Every Bill which shall hold passed the House of Representatives and the Senate. shall. before it become a Law. be presented to the President of the United States ; If he O.K. he shall subscribe it. but if non he shall return it. with his Expostulations to that House in which it shall hold originated. who shall come in the Expostulations at big on their Journal. and continue to reconsider it. ( Article 1. Section 7. United States Constitution )
Though the Congress enacts the jurisprudence. the president has the privilege to reject the jurisprudence through his exercising of the veto power. In consequence. the President. theoretically. can indirectly go a lawgiver by rejecting measures passed by Congress and by suggesting to the Congress that certain measures be passed. The same is true for Congress which may greatly act upon the exercising of the President of his authorization to implement the jurisprudence.
It is clearly stated in the US Constitution that it has the power to overrule the veto power of the President provided it has the needed Numberss back uping it. to humor: “If after such Reconsideration two tierces of that House shall hold to go through the Bill. it shall be sent. together with the Expostulations. to the other House. by which it shall similarly be reconsidered. and if approved by two tierces of that House. it shall go a Law.
But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays. and the Names of the Persons vote for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House severally. If any Bill shall non be returned by the President within 10 Days ( Sundays excepted ) after it shall hold been presented to him. the Same shall be a Law. in similar Manner as if he had signed it. unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return. in which Case it shall non be a Law. ” ( Article 1. Sec 7. United States Constitution )
In add-on. to its power to overrule presidential veto. Congress may choose to exert force per unit area to the president by non corroborating certain presidential assignments which the fundamental law has delegated to the Legislative Branch. In add-on. the Congress may besides exert its power to commence and originate its power of Impeachment. ( Gary W. Copeland ) In consequence. the Congress if it truly wants to ordain a measure into jurisprudence may convert the President with the exercising of its power to subscribe the measures into jurisprudence. Factors Why the President Veto Legislation
There are different positions on the president’s exercising of his veto power. Some say that the more the president exercises his veto power the more effectual leader he is. ( Jong R. Lee ) The theory is that a president who can act upon the Congress is more likely to blackball a measure and one time vetoed this measure will non be overridden by Congress. This appears to be conclusive sing the undermentioned statistics: from the clip of Washington to Nixon the veto was used 2. 257 times. Out of these. merely 75 vetoes or merely 6 % have been overridden by Congress.
On the other manus. some say that the president’s exercising of veto is a mark of failing on his portion. The thought here is that if the president truly had control and influence over the Congress so they would non hold passed these measures that prompted the president to overrule them in the first topographic point. The veto power is one of the potent arms which a president may exert under our democratic system of authorities. It is even stated that it is the power of the President to blackball statute laws that make him a dominant American political figure. Copeland ) The veto power of the president serves as a cheque to the power of the Legislative subdivision to do Torahs by exerting its veto power. One of the grounds cited for the exercising of the veto powers is because the measure is unconstitutional. The primary map of the President is non to delight his political party or to delight the electorates. His chief duty is to protect the fundamental law and to guarantee that the Torahs are passed in conformity with the United States Constitution.
As its defender. the Constitution has expressly given the president the power to veto measures which are unconstitutional. Therefore. several presidents have in the past vetoed measures on the land of their unconstitutionality. Therefore. see President Andrew Jackson who vetoed measures that seek to widen the charter of the Second Bank of the United States because he insisted the Bank was beyond the power of Congress to make. ( Bruce Fein ) Aside from the bill’s unconstitutionality. the president has besides in the past vetoed measures based on serious ethical and moral evidences.
One peculiar illustration is HR 810 or the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2006 which authorized the Secretary of State to carry on and back up research that utilizes human embryologic cells. This measure was vetoed by the president. ( “Message to the House of Representatives” ) In his veto message dated July 19. 2006. President George W. Bush states that as though he is in favour of researching the potencies of the research on root cell. he nevertheless is discerning about the ethical reverberations of the said research.
Signing this measure will let the calculated devastation of human embryos for the intent of research which is damaging to our state. In add-on. it is widely acknowledged that the past president have used the veto power non simply to protect the fundamental law. The president has in the yesteryear used the veto power non simply as a agency for protecting the fundamental law but besides for assorted political intents. It bears emphasizing that non all presidents have the support of the Congress. Several presidents in the yesteryear have to postulate with a hostile Congress to acquire the needed statute laws they wanted.
If the president would non be house in his response. it is possible that certain of import pieces of statute laws may non be passed at all. To avoid this from go oning some presidents in the yesteryear have resorted to the utmost method of blackballing more Torahs to remind that that he holds the power. See the instance of Franklin D. Roosevelt who in the past on occasion vetoed a piece of statute law merely to remind Congress that he is still in control ( Richard E. Neustadt 1976 ) Harry Truman and Gerald Ford used the veto power for the intent of finding differences in Congress to construct a political base. ( Neudstadt )
It is the kernel of democracy that the legislative and executive sections though they perform different undertakings are co-equal. This may or may non be advantageous for the whole people depending on the status of the state. It may go on that the state may see economic troubles. During this clip. Torahs must be fleetly passed so that the demands of the people will be addressed more rapidly. The ideal reaction would be that the Congress should pass on with the President so that they will hold an apprehension of what sort of Torahs need to be passed that can assist better the lives of the people.
However. the exact opposite happens during economic troubles. It is at this point that everybody wants to travel grandstanding believing that it is his best clip to indicate the incrimination to another politician. It is at this clip when every politician wants to be recognized for the littlest things he has done in the yesteryear. It is because of this ground that during economic troubles and adversities there are more measures that are being vetoed by the president. Research has besides shown that the president who feels that more electors are in his favour are more likely to utilize the veto power.
The thought here is that the more the president thinks that he has the electorate on his side the more that he will be given to exert this power to veto statute law. This could be measured by analysing the consequences of the election in the yesteryear. the higher the ballots the president gets the more likely it is that he will exert this power. The political party who sponsored the measure may besides act upon the determination of the president whether he will blackball it or non. The theory is that the more votes the measure receives from the members of his ain party in Congress. the more likely that the president will subscribe the measure into jurisprudence.
On the other manus. the less votes the measure receives from the members of his ain party. the more likely it is that the president will non subscribe the measure into jurisprudence. Normally. when a measure is sponsored by a representative from a political party different from that o the president. the best thing for him to make if he seeks to hold the measure passed into jurisprudence is to compromise with the president and the other political party. Compromise can be manifested by canceling some parts of the measure which is obnoxious on the portion of the other political party.
It bears emphasizing that if the patron of the measure refuses to extinguish these obnoxious parts it is more likely that the president will likewise garbage to sing the measure into jurisprudence and veto it. Conclusion The democratic system of authorities is so a composite system which requires the proper balance among its three subdivisions. Based on the foregoing. there are many factors why a president may do usage of his veto power. It could be because of the personality of the president. There are some presidents who are more inclined to blackball statute laws because they feel they have support of the electorate.
President may besides blackball statute law because of the individual patronizing the measure. It is possible if the patron of the measure is person other than a party mate of the president and the former does non do any via medias with the president such as canceling any obnoxious part of the measure so it is possible that the measure may be vetoed. Besides. it could be because of the defects in the measure itself such as it is unconstitutional. unethical and immoral or may be because it is non yet seasonably.