The Peloponnesian war was between the Athenian imperium and the members of the Peloponnesian Confederacy. The implicit in cause was the fright of the growing of the powers of Athens. The growing of this power endangered the nutrient supply of the Peloponnesian from the Sicily. Another facet which was thought to hold been the cause of the war was enforcement of monopoly of seaborne trade by the Athens. This made the Peloponnesian war a trade war.
Harmonizing to Thucydides security quandary occasioned by the rise of the great power rival. competitory bipolarity and an at hand power passage were powerful structural factors that contributed to instability and increased the likeliness of the war. The 2nd Punic war was between Carthage and the Roman democracy. Carthage wanted to concentrate on commanding Spain to derive direct control over the mineral resources and to mount an ground forces of the dwellers to travel against the Roman hosts.
Schemes of war by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Strategy harmonizing to Sun Tzu is the art that adult male invented after the Gods stopped steering him ; it is the greatest wining tool that adult male of all time invented. It is hence a manner of thought ; a witting and calculated procedure ; an intensive execution system ; the art of guaranting future success. Sun Tzu acknowledged that triumph was the chief aim in war. Therefore if long and delayed. arms blunted and morale depressed. Multiple metropoliss onslaught exhausted the strength of the military personnels.
Sun Tzu considered the moral. rational and circumstantial elements of war more of import than the physical and cautioned male monarchs and commanding officers non to put trust on the military power. Clausewitz tried the scheme that Isaac Newton had used in natural philosophies. but in war force was ne’er relative. equal and opposite. War can be said to be more of an art than a scientific discipline. This called for critical analysis ; scrutiny of all possible schemes. actions and determinations.
Thucydides emphasized that scheme or the leader can non be praised unless the scheme is proved to be better than the bing 1s and besides superior than the available options or knock a failed scheme unless it can be shown that there other superior options. Handel in Masters of War calls the thoughts of Sun Tzu vague. His chief statement was that differences between the schemes of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz were more illusive than existent. He suggested that Sun Tzu adopts a broader attack to war than Clausewitz. hence more unfastened wining by agencies that conflicts.
He affirmed that his work was non politically inclined but professional in perspective advocating that swayers ought non to interfere with military. Clausewitz emphasized the theoretical account of ineluctable fog of war. on the tactical and operational degrees. Handel alleged that the two words set side to side implied timeless fonts of strategic wisdom. This was blanketing both sides in permeant uncertainness. Clausewitz urged that that deliberate misrepresentation didn’t make much impact and it was a error to see surprise as cardinal component to success in war.
Harmonizing to Sun Tzu war was best complete rapidly. accomplishing one’s purposes and avoiding struggle was by far the most desirable result. While Clausewitz viewed it as an act of force intended to oblige 1s opposition to carry through the will of their aggressors connoting that struggle was the best manner of acquiring oppositions submit. Conflict takes a longer clip non like a conflict that is fought and what remains are the impacts. The strategic environment depended on rare full graduated table battles and grade of common consent.
This is clearly demonstrated by the Pericles of scheme of remaining within long walls and avoiding the invading of Spartans during the Peloponnesian war and besides by the Fabius Cunctator’s ability to shadow Hannibal through the usage of unsmooth land and Earth plants to obstruct the superior Punic Equus caballus and at long last the plunged into decisive clangs. Battle in antiquity was a high bets that conflicts sometimes dragged on for decennaries of busting and besiegings such as in the Peloponnesian and Carthaginian wars therefore both sides been at the same time prepared to put on the line everything on climatic confrontation in the unfastened field.
Therefore indecisive deadlocks build up which Sun Tzu says the manner out is the self-contradictory apothegm that indomitability lies in the defence. This can be broken by violative usage of information warfare. through hiding one’s ain strength and programs through seeking to misdirect surprise and scupper the enemy. Another scheme advocated by Sun Tzu is herding soldiers in little cantonments to do them look fewer and giving an feeling of fright to allure loath enemy to prosecute this was good adopted by Romans towards the Hannibal’s brothers in the Punic war.
During the Punic and Peloponnesian wars the defensive war scheme was the most used. This is why they would conceal behind walls and crowd in little cantonments to cut down onslaughts from the enemies. Analyzing Sun Tzu phrase wining without a conflict it implies that they stay in the cantonments good put for defence and to butcher their enemies when they appear. In Clausewitz’s rules for war. he urges that in defensive scheme military personnels seek to destruct their enemies indirectly while in violative scheme they pursues the purpose straight.
The scheme of morale was a well used component so. Misfortunes occurred when the ground forcess got panicky and were unwilling to try violative war. They sometimes would be really bold that they were unwilling to take any precautional steps. This called for programs to be made to do the enemy by expressions and words appear weak. This called for the morale edifice for the ground forcess which acted as a equilibrating tool and more as an imperative to beef up the military personnels. These besides made it possible for the military personnels to prosecute in a more violative war.
Ideas in continuity in the facet of doing scheme From the thoughts exposed by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz the scheme of violative and defensive war is still at work even today. This is ever determined by whether the enemy is superior or non. The best scheme for a superior opposition is defensive scheme. This is grounds today by the entrenched cantonments which are common in the wars that have occurred after the Punic and the Peloponnesian wars. Morale edifice is a cardinal component in the all ground forcess in the universe and besides in the all conflicts or wars.
The encouragement given to our military personnels today contributes a batch to the success of our states today. Today information warfare is one of the most popular ways of battling. It has proved to be really effectual as compared to other ways of deciding bing tenseness and making a get downing point to stoping bing struggle or the basal line for a war. Moral. rational and circumstantial elements of war are more of import than the physical facet of a military troop. Good arms can non supplements the good schemes and tactics used during war.
Even in the current universe that is really apparent ; arms in the custodies of an animate being may non accomplish anything whereas in the custodies of a trained forces much can be achieved. Comparison of different writers Comparing the thoughts of Thucydides and those of Handel. Thucydides has a more luxuriant description of the two wars. He non merely criticizes the schemes used by the Sun Tzu and Clausewitz but besides gives other options to be used to do the military personnels more effectual. The thoughts of Thucydides have a logical flow compared to those of Handel hence doing his work more clearer and good understood.
He besides argued that the Punic and the Peloponnesian wars had a batch of political deductions. so and even today. It was his footing for a batch of thoughts which have made him cognize. Harmonizing to him the Peloponnesian wars were influenced by realist writers. this besides greatly influenced the manner the United States viewed the ace powers. On the other manus. Handel ignored the disused practical thoughts of the Greek and the Roman military theoreticians and seeks to believe classically about scheme. He dismisses the thoughts of Sun Tzu as vague.
On contrast they all agree that the success of a war is non physical but it through rational elements and morale. In decision the thoughts of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz on scheme are ruling even the current universe ; non merely in war but besides in all facets of life including political relations. concern and instruction. Quality is the name to speak about ; to convey the whole facet of scheme and tactics. It is an country of great accent to the current universe and all it aspects Work cited: Cawkwell. G. L: Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. London. 1997.
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