Essay, Research Paper
I. IntroductionDuring the concluding old ages of the Sino-Japanese war ( 1944-45 ) , hegemony over Mainland China was clearly split between the postulating governments of the Kuomintang ( KMT or Nationalist Party ) and the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) . Despite efforts to settle their differences through American-mediated dialogues, in August of 1945, Chiang refused Mao s demand for a free election, and Mao would non give up weaponries without a KMT warrant to release its one-party monopoly. By the terminal of United States President Truman s Marshall Mission, those differences, through four old ages of efforts at dialogues and limited physical combat, remained unquestionably unreconcilable. In 1949, the Communist forces had clearly overwhelmed the Nationalists, doing Chiang Kai-shek, his authorities, and his followings to seek safety on Taiwan ( Formosa ) . Some perceivers of the Communist coup d’etat, such as Wan Yah-Kang in The Rise of Communism in China: ( 1920-1950 ) , concentrate their analysis of civil war between 1945 and 1949 on the basic scheme of the Chinese Communist Party and its aptitude to make full the political vacuity passively left by the Patriots. Correspondent A. Doak Barnett, nevertheless, acknowledges that the Communists would non hold been able to accomplish triumph in China if the Old government and society had non virtually disintegrated in the late 1940 s. This in head, one must take note that action taken by the Kuomintang, as opposed to passive Kuomintang public presentation, must hold been a factor ensuing in the failure of Chiang Kai-shek s Nationalist authorities. Consequently, which action of the Kuomintang, under the leading of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was most important in arousing the failure of the Chinese Nationalist motion between 1945 and 1949? In his book, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up at Seventy, Chiang Chung-Chen ( Chiang Kai-shek ) points to the undermentioned mistakes in policy and scheme [ : ] the recommencement of diplomatic dealingss with Soviet Russia the reorganisation and integrating of the Communist military personnels into the National Army the Government s handling of the job of the Northeast Provinces and the sign language of the armistice understanding with the Chinese Communists. While the grounds provided for these failures of the Nationalist authorities are non without footing and certification, the analysis that Chiang Kai-shek had furnished may be somewhat biased and uncomplete. Chiang Kai-shek s accounts for the failure of the Nationalist motion were written and translated in retrospect old ages after the fact. While the Generalissimo s history is clearly first-hand in that it is written by a adult male who held a cardinal place during the transpiration of the Nationalists licking, the nature of his expounding may be laced with efforts at exoneration for his determinations and policies.Thus, scrutiny of modern-day analysis by a assortment of historiographers combined with carefully considered narrative from cardinal participants of the period have brought about the undermentioned decisions sing the failure of the Chinese Nationalist motion between 1945 and 1949. Chiang Kai-shek s inability to appeal to the Chinese public through his inefficient economic policy and his portion in the corruptness within his disposal are each factors that have mostly contributed to the Communists licking of the Kuomintang. These factors are shadowed, nevertheless, by the province of Sino-American dealingss, particularly the Patriots response to the nonreversible American policies sing the mediation between the combative cabals. Therefore, although Chiang Kai-shek s domestic economic and political policies mostly contributed to the overwhelming of the Patriots forces by the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek s foreign dealingss with America entailed the most important factor arousing the failure of the Nationalist motion between the old ages 1945 and 1949. II. Domestic Support: Key to the Chinese Communists Party s Success By the terminal of 1945, the Kuomintang, when compared to the Communists, held most of Mainland China s districts, all the major metropoliss and rail lanes, and a militarily superior ground forces of 2+ million habitues and 1+ million reserves. Through 1948, the Patriots army maintained a two to one advantage over the Communists. Furthermore, the Nationalists received much American military support, supplies, and advice through the clip of war s decision in 1949. It would look that Chiang Kai-shek held the upper manus for first few old ages of the civil war. What so did the Generalissimo deficiency, rendering useless the advantages he held at the oncoming of the war? In order to analyze the comparative importance of the factors arousing the failure of the Chinese Nationalist motion between 1945 and 1949, a standard with which to mensurate the significance of the defined factors must foremost be determined and assessed. The result of the Chinese Civil War between 1945 and 1949 indicates Chinese domestic support as the key to the Chinese Communists Party s success. While the Kuomintang may hold held more territory, and a militarily superior reserves, by 1949, it was evident that the Nationalist Government was clearly runing without respect for its maps as a authorities to function the populace. The policies adopted by the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek s naivete toward domestic rising prices and land reform and his inefficient use of American support, provided the public with small inducement to back up the Patriots in their battle. Therefore, this analysis of the comparative significance of the factors that caused the Patriots failure in its conflict for China will utilize the extent to which each policy roused Chinese domestic support as the standards with which significance will be measured. Therefore, to reexamine my thesis given the established makings, Chiang Kai-shek s response to American policy roused significantly less support for the Nationalist motion than his domestic political and economic policies.III. The United States: Large Brother to Nationalist China Through efforts to intercede the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, the United States had assumed the place of Big Brother to Chiang Kai-shek s Nationalist authorities. By 1944, it was believed that the United States, by virtuousness of a [ sic ] understanding, place, and economic resources would bask a greater influence in China than any other foreign power. China was to be the United States of the Asiatic continent, a huge united and liberal-democratic power. Mainland China bore the fertile land on which American-inspired capitalist economy and concerns could take root. Chiang Kai-shek s response to America s China policy proved to be extremely uneffective, deriving small support for the Nationalist party by the Chinese. However ab initio good intentioned, the American ideals and the Sino-American policies that transpired thenceforth entailed the most important factor straight resulted in the failure of the Nationalist motion the Kuomintang s credence of American mediation in its struggle with the Communists. On the contrary, Chiang Kai-shek justified the necessity of accepting American mediation with the fact that at the clip the Government was ready for an honest colony for the interest of domestic peace. He suggests that, had Nationalist authorities non accepted American mediation, the Kuomintang would hold perished against Soviet imperialism or Russian hegemony in the Northeast Provinces. Furthermore, the Patriots may hold recognized the Communists initial attack to dialogues as a delaying tactic meant to continue good-humored dealingss with the Kuomintang while its armed forces was still comparatively weak. Despite this acknowledgment, Chiang Kai-shek claimed that the credence of the armistice understanding was made to continue the Patriots aim to construct up China as a democratic state. In order to accomplish democracy, a via media would hold to be reached between the Kuomintang and Communist cabals. The inherently contradictory nature of Sino-American policy, nevertheless, inhibited the realisation of this Nationalist end. The want for a worthy cause seems to hold contributed to the critical positions held by American functionaries toward the Nationalists authorities despite its limited influence over and understanding of Chiang Kai-shek and Sino-American dealingss in the early 1940s. Between September 1944 and November 1945, General Patrick Hurley attempted to implement a policy to strengthen the Nationalist authorities by pressing economic, administrative, and democratic reforms, and a alliance with other parties. The Chinese Communists appeared willing to come in a alliance authorities and put their military forces under that authorities so long as they retained a place of strength in stead the via media. The Patriot, nevertheless, wanted foremost to hold explicit control over the military before supplying the Communists with the shared authorization constituent of the understanding. As dialogues on the alliance were swerving toward dead end, Hurley s understandings went to the side of the Nationalist authorities. Although some members of his staff recognized that his place as go-between would be hopeless unless he remained impartial to the conflicting cabals, Hurley continued exercising relatively lesser force per unit area on the Patriots to reform its disposal and decide on a via media with the Communists. At this clip, John Carter Vincent, manager of Far Eastern personal businesss from the twelvemonth 1945 to 1947, recalled that we [ Americans ] were awfully concerned over the consequence of an eruption of general civil war in China. Upon Hurley s surrender and amid lifting bitternesss from both the Patriots and the Communists, President Harry S. Truman recognized that the United States must exercise whatever influence we might hold to forestall civil war. The option to a alliance authorities in China appeared to be Soviet backed and all-communist. In response to mounting European influences for the United States to prosecute an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist policy, President Truman sent General George C. Marshall on what became known as the Marshall Mission. In December of 1945, Truman instructed Marshall to seek the fusion of China by peaceable democratic methods. Marshall was faced with transporting out an inherently contradictory foreign policy. Ideally, the United States wanted the peaceable fusion of China under a broad democratic authorities. Give the nature of the conflicting Nationalist and Communist parties and their present and possible military capablenesss, the chance of peace and democracy would non be achieved without a via media. At one point in the latter portion of 1947, Patriots and Communists met as the Political Consultative Conference and agreed to an uneasy armistice that entailed ( 1 ) a military armistice, ( 2 ) a political and constitutional understanding, and ( 3 ) an understanding on the reorganisation and control of military forces. Despite dialogues, the civil war was merely suspended. However willing both parties were to negociate footings of via media under American mediation, their reluctance to entirely hold to the other party s petitions sealed the failure of the Marshall Mission. In 1947, General Marshall returned to the United States and washed his custodies of China and the idealistic American policy that remained unfulfilled over the class of a twelvemonth of ineffectual dialogues. In early August of 1949, America s State Department issued a 1054-page White Paper on China imputing the failure to counter the Communist revolution scheme to the basic failing of Chiang s authorities. In this papers, Secretary of State, Dean G. Acheson attempted to warrant the failure of America s policy by saying The unfortunate but ineluctable fact is that the baleful consequence of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the authorities of the United States. Nothing that this state did or could hold done within the sensible bounds of its capablenesss could hold changed that consequence ; nil that was left undone by this state has contributed to it. Acheson s White Paper on China contains a funny expounding on Sino-American policy during the Chinese Communist rise to power. While its initial intent was its use as a tool of propaganda, warranting the consequences of the United States policy toward China during the clip of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle, this paper now farther attests to the extent of America s misinterpretation of China s internal quandary. During the first few old ages of the war, the United States approached the internal struggles in China on the side of the Nationalist and particularly Chiang Kai-shek. This attack was consistent with the propaganda that between 1936 and 1945, had portrayed Chiang Kai-shek as a hero, a soldier-saint, and a Jesus of modern China [ and ] a guardian of democracy, renowned by Time magazine with Madame Chiang Kai-shek as Man and Wife of the Year and even compared to George Washington in the booklet China America s Ally as a great [ radical ] leader in war and peace. Wh
ile these beneficent impressions of leader Chiang Kai-shek went on to progress America s position of Chinese Patriots, this American benevolence toward China was transformed into an overdone impression of Chinese friendly relationship for the United States. America, excessively concerned with anti-Communistic sentiment and burdened by old ages of pro-Chiang Kai-shek propaganda, fell abruptly of comprehending the similarities between the beginnings and battles of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. While both cabals were conceived amid the anti-Western and nationalist thoughts the swept through China during the 1920s America s shrouded apprehension of each party s political orientations brought about the partial nature of its policies. The White Paper and the response it elicited illustrate America s ardent attempts feed the myth that the United States had lost China [ due to ] lese majesty and accommodate its portion in the Kuomintang s loss of Mainland China.
Despite America s rejection of the failure of its Sino-American policies, Chiang Kai-shek s employment of American aid did small to indue domestic support for the Nationalist party. As opposed to the Communists Ta, Ta! T an! T an! Fight awhile and talk awhile, so battle and speak once more! scheme, the Nationalists did non every bit stress combat and negotiating. Rather, the Kuomintang paid disadvantageous, selective attending to contending readyings, dialogues, and America s vague aid. While the United States had supplied Chiang Kai-shek with $ 3,078 million in military and economic assistance accompanied by professional military advice between VJ twenty-four hours and March of 1949 really small of this American aid found its manner to any other Chinese leaders. This equivocal policy even received the undermentioned appraisal from Communist leader Mao Tse-tung: Judgment by the big sum of assistance the United States is giving Chiang Kai-shek to enable him to pay civil war on an unprecedented graduated table, the policy of the U.S. Government is to utilize alleged mediation as a smoke screen for beef uping Chiang Kai-shek in every manner and stamp downing the democratic forces in China through Chiang Kai-shek s policy of slaughter so as to cut down China to a practical U.S. settlement. Due to its bootless consequences, American policy, upon making the Chinese people, was met with small gratitude and support. Sino-American dealingss and Chiang Kai-shek s use of their policies, by bestiring small if non detering domestic support for the Nationalist motion, is the most important cause of the licking of the Kuomintang by the Chinese Communist Party between 1945 and 1949.IV. Chiang Kai-shek s Economic Policies Of the factors taking the Kuomintang s licking by the Chinese Communists between 1945 and 1949, the inefficiency of Chiang Kai-shek s economic policy instantly anterior to and during the civil war is frequently named. Prior to 1945, Chiang Kai-shek s domestic economic policy held bilateral purposes directed toward prolonging University instruction, the hereafter of China, while puting in the strength of the military. To accomplish these consequences, the Nationalists did non utilize pupils in the war attempt but instead provided them stipends with which to go on their instruction. Furthermore, it was from the peasantry that the Nationalists conscripted soldiers and, through the late fortiess, received a bulk of their financess through revenue enhancement. After the Sino-Japanese war, efforts at equilibrating the budget and stabilising the currency took their toll on the Chiang Kai-shek s efforts at economic Reconstruction. These economic troubles combined with Communist propaganda and demoralisation affirms the significance of Chiang Kai-shek s domestic economic policy as a factor bring oning the failure of the Nationalist movement.With respect to the constitution of instruction, the secret constabulary of the authorities set up preparation centres that tried to indoctrinate [ professors ] with trueness to the Three People s Principles. These actions discouraged the support of the domestic intellectuals by have oning down the trust that lay between them and the authorities. The Kuomintang whether they were incognizant or simply nescient to the actions of the secret constabulary continued with their investing in instruction. Alternatively of larning to populate off of the agricultural outputs of the land as the Chinese Communist were making, the Kuomintang economic system relied to a great extent on crying fees and revenue enhancement to postpone the costs of the Sino-Japanese war. This action led to economic instability that was farther aggravated by rising prices. After the Sino-Japanese war, the Nationalist authorities was faced with the issue of equilibrating the budget that had been upset by big military outgos. To most expeditiously equilibrate the budget, the Patriots would hold to diminish the size of its military. The Communists foiled these programs, nevertheless, when they engaged in struggle, coercing the Nationalists to keep their Numberss in order to keep militarily high quality. Furthermore, the Nationalists entree to Northern China and Manchuria, the most extremely industrialised parts of Mainland China, was impeded by Communist control of and actions in the countryside, North of the Yangtze River. There, the Communists cut off Nationalists lines of communicating by destructing industrial mills and mines followed by hindering the subsequent Reconstruction attempts. Therefore, Kuomintang attempts to travel into Manchuria and Northern China were well hindered by limited lines of communicating outside of those areas.Mismanagement of the economic system, in which rising prices due to lessenings in production was on the rise, diminished domestic support of the Nationalists. Although rising prices ab initio aided agricultural manufacturers by raising harvest monetary values, it was shortly offset by heavy additions in revenue enhancement. When production ceased under the Nationalists decreasing control of China, it was non resumed in metropoliss recovering from the war. This ensuing lessening in production led to rising prices, higher unemployment, and lessenings in ingestion. As a consequence, famishment and local corruptness continued throughout the countryside. In add-on, as military personnels, liberated from the Japanese, returned to the states, they brought with them increased loads of revenue enhancement and requisition. To help the Nationalist and oppose this Communist behaviour, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration provided supplies and repaired power lines and lines of communicating with about $ 650,00,000 in assistance. This aid, of which America had contributed over 70 per cent, was halted in 1946. In Soviet Russia In China, Chiang Kai-shek makes known that it was likely to bear on my Government to accept its mediation recommendations so as to assist reconstruct domestic peace in China. What & # 8217 ; s more, to bask economic prosperity depended on demobilisation and Reconstruction, which, in bend, depended on the American Government s attitude toward the Chinese Communists machinations. Therefore, when Communist propaganda succeeded in weakening Sin-American cooperation, the Chinese people began losing bosom in the affair of national Reconstruction. While Chiang Kai-shek s economic policies discouraged Chinese domestic support, its roots in America s China policy rank this factor less important than the Sino-American dealingss on which this factor hinged as a cause of the Nationalists loss of the mainland. While American economic aid played a important function early on in Chiang Kai-shek s economic policy, its absence in the currency reform of 1948 an facet that can non be overlooked in the scrutiny of the Nationalists economic policy. The transition of coinage and foreign currencies into gilded kwai was meant to get by with troubles in the money market between September 1945 and February 1947. Alternatively of making fixed monetary values or rectifying rising prices, the Nationalist authorities was unable to make any long-run currency stabilisation program doing monetary values to lift 85,000 times in six months. While this policy was realized absent American facilitation, it farther deteriorated what was left of people s assurance in the currency after Sino-American dealingss had taken place.V. Chiang Kai-shek s Political PoliciesMany historiographers, such as John King Fairbanks in The Great Chinese Revolution and Wan Yah-Kang in The Rise of Communism, have pointed to the Patriots failure in the mishandl [ ing ] of its people that led to the alienat [ ion ] of major constituents of the Chinese people. This began by The Patriots request for Nipponese generals to give up their forces and arms to the official commanding officers of the assorted Chinese war zones, all Kuomintang officers. This demand aggravated the Communists, puting Chinese forces against Chinese a extremely unpopular move after a united triumph over Japan. In add-on, due to the great accent Chiang Kai-shek placed on economic policy after the Sino-Japanese war, the Patriots focused much of their attempts on war readyings alternatively of civilian development. These unfavourable policies widened the spread between the populace and the Nationalist government.During the Sino-Japanese war, Communist forces had infiltrated much of the Northeast countryside of China. While they besieged the Japanese, they besides won peasant support through their execution of agricultural and land reforms. These reforms involved betterments such as the proviso of peasant demands, the improvement of agricultural cooperation, and the mobilisation of villagers against the present local governments. Therefore, upon the Nationalist coup d’etat of Northeast China metropoliss, the villagers and countryside were unwilling to accept Nationalist authorization unless the Reformed local authoritiess instituted by the Communists were besides accepted. Consequently, the Nationalist authorities, in stead of the domestic bitterness that Chiang Kai-shek s economic policies had developed, found itself extremely opposed in the countryside by both the Communists and the provincials. In Pahsien, for illustration, the Kuomintang was viewed as an uninspired, listless, vagabond organisation that seemingly is non interested in making much of anything except maintain its monopoly place in political relations and authorities service. Although Chiang Kai-shek controlled most of China in 1948, the Communists were rapidly deriving peasant support from its large-scale motion to redistribute land. Furthermore, new provincial recruits every bit good as surrendered KMT military personnels enthusiastically joined the Communist-led ranks of what became known as the People s Liberation Army ( PLA ) . It is interesting to observe that after Chiang Kai-shek had withdrawn from Mainland China to the island of Taiwan, his authorities introduced a series of controversial but finally successful reforms. His land reform policy remains the most noteworthy of them. Ironically, had he introduced and implemented some of these reforms while on the mainland, the Communists might non hold gained such a strong presence at that place. While the Patriots relied on American aeroplanes to transport nutrient and supplies to the military personnels, the PLA could trust on the advantage of big, organized hosts of peasant labourers. Chiang Kai-shek s military focal point, similar to his economic policies, had many of its roots in American assistance and aid. Therefore, as a factor taking to the failure of the Nationalist motion between 1945 and 1949, Chiang Kai-shek s political policies remain secondary to the Sino-American policy factor. VI. Decision In December of 1948 Secretary of State, Marshall, summarized the American analysis of the state of affairs in China by saying that in order to accomplish the aim of cut downing the Chinese Communists to a wholly negligible factor in China it would be necessary for the United States virtually to take over the Chinese authorities and administrate its economic, military and authorities personal businesss. Clearly, America s foreign policy toward the Nationalist authorities in China between 1945 and 1949 held great influence in the Kuomintang s public presentation against the Communists in the war. While propaganda, such as Acheson s White Paper on China and the loss of China myth, have attempted to estrange American foreign policy from this tragic period in China s history, the reverberations of Chiang Kai-shek s actions, seen through the decreasing support of the Chinese people, affirm the significance of this factor in arousing the failure of the Nationalist motion. To readdress the inquiry, which action of the Kuomintang, under the leading of Chiang Kai-shek, was most important in arousing the failure of the Chinese Nationalist motion between 1945 and 1949? Whereas many of Chiang Kai-shek s economic and political policies were dependent upon the American authorities s attitude toward China, the beginnings of the decreasing domestic support that these policies procured can besides be traced to Sino-American dealingss. Consequently, the most important factor in arousing the loss of Mainland China by the Nationalist party embody the Sino-American dealingss under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek between 1945 and 1949.