Ancient. medieval and early modern * Hammurabi ( died c. 1750 BCE ) * Confucius ( 551-479 BCE ) * Socrates ( 470-399 BCE ) * Mozi ( 470-390 BCE ) * Xenophon ( 427-355 BCE ) * Plato ( 427-347 BCE ) * Diogenes of Sinope ( 412-323 BCE ) * Aeschines ( 389-314 BCE ) * Aristotle ( 384-322 BCE ) * Mencius ( 372-289 BCE ) * Chanakya ( 350-283 BCE ) * Xun Zi ( 310-237 BCE ) * Thiruvalluvar ( c. 200 BCE-c. 30 BCE ) * Han Feizi ( ? -233 BCE ) * Cicero ( 106-43 BCE )
* Pliny the Younger ( 63-113 CE ) * Saint Augustine ( 354-430 CE ) * Muhammad al-Shaybani ( 749-805 ) * Al-Farabi ( 870-950 ) * Ghazali ( 1058–1111 ) * Averroes ( Ibn Rushd ) ( 1126–1198 ) * Al-Mawardi ( 972–1058 ) * Maimonides ( 1135–1204 ) * St. Thomas Aquinas ( 1225–1274 ) * Ibn Taymiyyah ( 1263–1328 ) * Marsilius of Padua ( 1270–1342 ) * William of Ockham ( 1285–1349 ) * Ibn Khaldun ( 1332–1406 ) * Christine de Pizan ( 1363–1434 )
* Niccolo Machiavelli ( 1469–1527 ) * Martin Luther ( 1483–1546 ) * Thomas Muntzer ( 1490–1525 ) * John Calvin ( 1509–1564 ) * Richard Hooker ( 1554–1600 ) | Modern ( born pre-19th century ) * Jean Bodin ( 1530–1596 ) * Francis Bacon ( 1561–1626 ) * Hugo Grotius ( 1583–1645 ) * Thomas Hobbes ( 1588–1679 ) * James Harrington ( 1611–1677 ) * John Locke ( 1632–1704 ) * Baruch Spinoza ( 1632–1677 ) * Montesquieu ( 1689–1755 ) * Francois-Marie Arouet ( Voltaire ) ( 1694–1778 ) * Shah Waliullah ( 1703–1763 ) * Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab ( 1703–1792 )
* David Hume ( 1711–1776 ) * Frederick the Great ( Frederick II ) ( 1712–1786 ) * Jean-Jacques Rousseau ( 1712–1788 ) * Immanuel Kant ( 1724–1804 ) * William Blackstone ( 1723–1780 ) * Adam Smith ( 1723–1790 ) * Edmund Burke ( 1729–1797 ) * Thomas Paine ( 1737–1809 ) * Thomas Jefferson ( 1743–1826 ) * Jeremy Bentham ( 1748–1832 ) * James Madison ( 1751–1836 ) * William Godwin ( 1756–1836 ) * Mary Wollstonecraft ( 1759–1797 ) * Henri de Saint-Simon ( 1760–1825 )
* Thomas Robert Malthus ( 1766–1834 ) * Benjamin Constant ( 1767–1830 ) * Georg W. F. Hegel ( 1770–1831 ) * David Ricardo ( 1772–1823 ) * Charles Fourier ( 1772–1837 ) * James Mill ( 1773–1836 ) * Arthur Schopenhauer ( 1788–1860 ) * Thomas Carlyle ( 1795–1881 ) * Auguste Comte ( 1798–1857 ) | Born in 19th century * Rifa’ al-Tahtawi ( 1801–1873 ) * Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach ( 1804–1872 ) * Alexis de Tocqueville ( 1805–1859 ) * Max Stirner ( 1806–1856 ) * John Stuart Mill ( 1806–1873 ) * Simion Barnu?
iu ( 1808–1864 ) * Pierre-Joseph Proudhon ( 1809–1865 ) * Soren Kierkegaard ( 1813–1855 ) * Mikhail Bakunin ( 1814–1876 ) * Henry David Thoreau ( 1817–1862 ) * Karl Marx ( 1818–1883 ) * Sir Syed Ahmad Khan ( 1818–1898 ) * Friedrich Engels ( 1820–1895 ) * Herbert Spencer ( 1820–1903 ) * Thomas Hill Green ( 1836–1882 ) * William Graham Sumner ( 1840–1910 ) * Peter Kropotkin ( 1842–1921 ) * Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844–1900 ) * Georges Sorel ( 1847-1922 ) * Eduard Bernstein ( 1850–1932 ) * Thorstein Bunde Veblen ( 1857–1929 ) * John Dewey ( 1859–1952 ) * Max Weber ( 1864–1920 ) * Sun Yat-sen ( 1866–1925 ) * Benedetto Croce ( 1866–1952 )
* Mohandas Karam Chand Gandhi ( 1869–1948 ) * Rosa Luxemburg ( 1870–1919 ) * Bertrand Russell ( 1872–1970 ) * Giovanni Gentile ( 1875–1944 ) * Muhammad Iqbal ( 1877–1938 ) * Pantaleo Carabellese ( 1877–1948 ) * Martin Buber ( 1878–1965 ) * Otto Bauer ( 1881–1938 ) * Georg Lukacs ( 1885–1971 ) * Sergio Panunzio ( 1886–1944 ) * Carl Schmitt ( 1888–1985 ) * Martin Heidegger ( 1889–1976 ) * Antonio Gramsci ( 1891–1937 ) * Walter Benjamin ( 1892–1940 ) * Herman Dooyeweerd ( 1894-1977 ) * Max Horkheimer ( 1895–1973 ) * Wilhelm Reich ( 1897–1957 )
* Herbert Marcuse ( 1898–1979 ) * Leo Strauss ( 1899–1973 ) * Alfred Sohn-Rethel ( 1899–1990 ) * Friedrich Hayek ( 1899–1992 ) | Born in twentieth century * Erich Fromm ( 1900–1980 ) * Michael Oakeshott ( 1901–1990 ) * Karl Popper ( 1902–1994 ) * Theodor Adorno ( 1903–1969 ) * Raymond Aron ( 1905–1983 ) * Jean-Paul Sartre ( 1905–1980 ) * Hannah Arendt ( 1906–1975 ) * Sayyid Qutb ( 1906–1966 ) * Simone Weil ( 1909–1943 ) * Isaiah Berlin ( 1909–1997 ) * Norberto Bobbio ( 1909–2004 ) * Albert Camus ( 1913–1960 ) * Roland Barthes ( 1915–1980 ) * Fazlur Rahman Malik ( 1919–1988 ) * Louis Althusser ( 1918–1990 ) * John Rawls ( 1921–2002 ) * Cornelius Castoriadis ( 1922–1997 )
* Sheldon S. Wolin ( 1922 – ) * Frantz Fanon ( 1925–1961 ) * Gilles Deleuze ( 1925–1995 ) * Murray Rothbard ( 1926-1995 ) * Michel Foucault ( 1926–1984 ) * Judith Shklar ( 1928–1992 ) * Jean Baudrillard ( 1929–2007 ) * Jurgen Habermas ( 1929- ) * Bernard Williams ( 1929-2003 ) * Felix Guattari ( 1930–1992 ) * Ronald Dworkin ( 1931- ) * Charles Taylor ( 1931- ) * Guy Debord ( 1931–1994 ) * Harvey C. Mansfield ( 1932 – ) * Antonio Negri ( 1933- ) * Fredric Jameson ( 1934- ) * Wendell Berry ( 1934 – ) * Michael Walzer ( 1935 – )
* Thomas Nagel ( 1937 – ) * William E. Connolly ( 1938 – ) * Robert Nozick ( 1938–2002 ) * Douglas W. Rae ( 1939- ) * Jacques Ranciere ( 1940- ) * Etienne Balibar ( 1942- ) * Lorenzo Pena ( 1944- ) * Giacomo Marramao ( 1946- ) * James Tully ( 1946- ) * Slavoj Zizek ( 1947- ) * Judith Butler ( 1956- ) * Nayef Al-Rodhan ( 1959- ) | Jean Jacques Rousseau Jean-Jacques Rousseau ( Gallic: [ ? ? ? ? Alaska? uso ] ; 28 June 1712 – 2 July 1778 ) was a Genevan philosopher. author. and composer of 18th-century.
Hispolitical doctrine influenced the Gallic Revolution every bit good as the overall development of modern political. sociological. and educational idea. Rousseau’s fresh Emile: or. On Education is a treatise on the instruction of the whole individual for citizenship. His sentimental fresh Julie. or the New Heloise was of importance to the development of pre-romanticism [ 1 ] and romanticism in fiction.
[ 2 ] Rousseau’s autobiographical writings—hisConfessions. which initiated the modern autobiography. and his Reveries of a Solitary Walker—exemplified the late 18th-century motion known as the Age of Sensibility. and featured an increased focal point on subjectiveness and self-contemplation that subsequently characterized modern authorship. His Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and his On the Social Contract are basiss in modern political and societal idea.
Rousseau was a successful composer of music. who wrote seven operas every bit good as music in other signifiers. and made parts to music as a theoretician. During the period of the Gallic Revolution. Rousseau was the most popular of the philosophes among members of the Jacobin Club. Rousseau was interred as a national hero in the Pantheon in Paris. in 1794. 16 old ages after his decease.
The Necessity of Freedom In his work. Rousseau addresses freedom more than any other job of political doctrine and aims to explicate how adult male in the province of nature is blessed with an enviable sum freedom. This freedom is entire for two grounds. First. natural adult male is physically free because he is non constrained by a inhibitory province setup or dominated by his fellow work forces. Second. he is psychologically and spiritually free because he is non enslaved to any of the unreal demands that characterize modern society. This 2nd sense of freedom. the freedom from demand. makes up a peculiarly insightful and radical constituent of Rousseau’s doctrine.
Rousseau believed modern man’s captivity to his ain demands was responsible for all kinds of social ailments. from development and domination of others to hapless self-esteem and depression. Rousseau believed that good authorities must hold the freedom of all its citizens as its most cardinal aim. The Social Contract in peculiar is Rousseau’s effort to conceive of the signifier of authorities that best affirms the single freedom of all its citizens. with certain restraints built-in to a complex. modern. civil society. Rousseau acknowledged that every bit long as belongings and Torahs exist. people can ne’er be as wholly free in modern society as they are in the province of nature. a point subsequently echoed by Marx and many other Communist and anarchist societal philosophers.
However. Rousseau strongly believed in the being of certain rules of authorities that. if enacted. can afford the members of society a degree of freedom that at least approximates the freedom enjoyed in the province of nature. In The Social Contract and his other plants of political doctrine. Rousseau is devoted to sketching these rules and how they may be given look in a functional modern province.
Specifying the Natural and the State of Nature For Rousseau to win in finding which social establishments and constructions contradict man’s natural goodness and freedom. he must foremost specify the ”natural” . Rousseau strips off all the thoughts that centuries of development have imposed on the true nature of adult male and concludes that many of the thoughts we take for granted. such as belongings. jurisprudence. and moral inequality. really have no footing in nature.
For Rousseau. modern society by and large compares unfavourably to the ”state of nature. ” As Rousseau discusses in the Discourse on Inequality and The Social Contract. the province of nature is the conjectural. prehistoric topographic point and clip where human existences live uncorrupted by society. The most of import feature of the province of nature is that people have complete physical freedom and are at autonomy to make basically as they wish. That said. the province of nature besides carries the drawback that human existences have non yet discovered reason or morality.
In different plants. Rousseau alternately emphasizes the benefits and deficits of the province of nature. but by and big he reveres it for the physical freedom it grants people. leting them to be unencumbered by the coercive influence of the province and society. In this respect. Rousseau’s construct of the province of nature is wholly more positive than Hobbes’s construct of the same thought. as Hobbes. who originated the term. viewed the province of nature as basically a province of war and savageness.
This difference in definition indicates the two philosophers’ differing positions of human nature. which Rousseau viewed as basically good and Hobbes as basically base and brutal. Finally. Rousseau acknowledged that although we can ne’er return to the province of nature. understanding it is indispensable for society’s members to more to the full recognize their natural goodness.
The Danger of Need Rousseau includes an analysis of human demand as one component in his comparing of modern society and the province of nature. Harmonizing to Rousseau. “needs” consequence from the passions. which make people desire an object or activity. In the province of nature. human demands are purely limited to those things that guarantee endurance and reproduction. including nutrient. slumber. and sex. By contrast. as cooperation and division of labour develop in modern society. the demands of work forces multiply to include many incidental things. such as friends. amusement. and luxury goods. As clip goes by and these kinds of demands progressively become a portion of mundane life. they become necessities.
Although many of these demands are ab initio enjoyable and even good for human existences. work forces in modern society finally become slaves to these otiose demands. and the whole of society is bound together and shaped by their chase. As such. unneeded demands are the foundation of modern “moral inequality. ” in that the chase of demands necessarily means that some will be forced to work to carry through the demands of others and some will rule their chaps when in a place to make so. Rousseau’s construct of demand. and particularly the more unreal types that dominate modern society. are a peculiarly applicable component of his doctrine for the present clip.
Given the huge wealth that exists in a state such as the United States and the extent to which consumerism is the driving force behind its economic system. Rousseau’s penetrations should arouse contemplation for anyone concerned about the ways the American civilization nurtures a population of people progressively enslaved by unreal demands. The Possibility of Authenticity in Modern Life Linked to Rousseau’s general effort to understand how modern life differs from life in the province of nature is his peculiar focal point on the inquiry of how reliable the life of adult male is in modern society. By reliable. Rousseau basically means how closely the life of modern adult male reflects the positive properties of his natural ego.
Not surprisingly. Rousseau feels that people in modern society by and large unrecorded rather unauthentic lives. In the province of nature. adult male is free to merely go to to his ain natural demands and has few occasions to interact with other people. He can merely “be. ” while modern adult male must frequently “appear” every bit much as “be” so as to deviously recognize his pathetic demands. The full system of unreal demands that governs the life of civil society makes genuineness or truth in the traffics of people with one another about impossible. Since persons are ever seeking to lead on and/or rule their fellow citizens to recognize their ain single demands. they seldom act in an reliable manner toward their fellow human existences.
Even more damningly. the fact that modern people organize their lives around unreal demands means that they are unauthentic and untrue to themselves every bit good. To Rousseau’s head. the beginning of civil society itself can be traced to an act of misrepresentation. when one adult male invented the impression of private belongings by enveloping a piece of land and converting his simple neighbours “this is mine. ” while holding no true footing whatsoever to make so. Give this fact. the modern society that has sprung away from this act can be nil but unauthentic to the nucleus. The Unnaturalness of Inequality For Rousseau. the inquiries of why and how human existences are of course equal and unequal. if they are unequal at all. are cardinal to his larger philosophical question.
To organize his review of modern society’s jobs. he must demo that many of the signifiers of inequality endemic to society are in fact non natural and can hence be remedied. His decisions and larger line of concluding in this statement are laid out in the Discourse on Inequality. but the basic push of his statement is that human inequality as we know it does non be in the province of nature. In fact. the lone sort of natural inequality. harmonizing to Rousseau. is the physical inequality that exists among work forces in the province of nature who may be more or less able to supply for themselves harmonizing to their physical properties. Consequently. all the inequalities we recognize in modern society are characterized by the being of different categories or the domination and development of some people by others.
Rousseau footings these sorts of inequalitiesmoral inequalities. and he devotes much of his political doctrine to placing the ways in which a merely authorities can seek to turn over them. In general. Rousseau’s speculations on inequality. every bit good as his extremist averment of the impression that all work forces are by-and-large equal in their natural province. were of import inspirations for both the American and Gallic Revolutions. The General Will and the Common Good Possibly the most hard and quasi-metaphysical construct in Rousseau’s political doctrine is the rule of the general will. As Rousseau explains. the general will is the will of the crowned head. or all the people together. that aims at the common good—what is best for the province as a whole.
Although each person may hold his or her ain specific will that expresses what is good for him or her. in a healthy province. where people right value the corporate good of all over their ain personal good. the merger of all peculiar volitions. the “will of all. ” is tantamount to the general will. In a province where the coarsenesss of private involvement prevail over the common involvements of the collective. the will of all can be something rather different from the general will.
The most concrete manifestation of the general will in a healthy province comes in the signifier of jurisprudence. To Rousseau. Torahs should ever enter what the people jointly desire ( the general will ) and should ever be universally applicable to all members of the province. Further. they should be to guarantee that people’s single freedom is upheld. thereby vouching that people remain loyal to the crowned head at all times.
Rousseau’s abstract construct of the general will raises some hard inquiries. The first is. how can we cognize that the will of all is truly tantamount with the common good? The 2nd is. presuming that the general will is existing and can be expressed in Torahs. what are the establishments that can accurately estimate and codify the general will at any given clip?
Undertaking these complex quandary occupied a big part of Rousseau’s political idea. and he attempts to reply them in The Social Contract. among other topographic points. The Idea of Collective Sovereignty Until Rousseau’s clip. the crowned head in any given province was regarded as the cardinal authorization in that society. responsible for ordaining and implementing all Torahs.
Most frequently. the autonomous took the signifier of an important sovereign who possessed absolute rule over his or her topics. In Rousseau’s work. nevertheless. sovereignty takes on a different significance. as sovereignty is said to shack in all the people of the society as a collective.
The people. as a autonomous entity. show their sovereignty through their general will and must ne’er hold their sovereignty abrogated by anyone or anything outside their corporate ego. In this respect. sovereignty is non identified with the authorities but is alternatively opposed against it. The government’s map is therefore merely to implement and esteem the crowned head will of the people and in no manner seek to quash or rule the general will.